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Abstract
The steady increase in air traffic imposes a need
for enhanced airport capacity, and the desire to
safely reduce existing separation standards. An
important limiting factor in establishing required
separation standards is the risk imposed by wake
vortices.
A probabilistic model is developed for the
determination of wake vortex induced accident
risk. The modeling approach is integrated within a
stochastic framework. Four probabilistic sub
models are being used:
• Wake vortex evolution model;
• Wake vortex interaction model;
• Aircraft control capability model;
• Flight path evolution model.
This probabilistic model can be used for an
assessment of wake vortex safety related to
different ATM concepts or procedures. It provides
a tool to evaluate the separation standards for the
current practice, and for promising new concepts
which may enable a safe reduction of the current
separation standards. Numerical evaluation results
can be fed back to ATM designers, who can use
these results to redesign or improve their proposed
ATM concept.
A safety management framework, which
describes how to judge the acceptability of the
obtained safety assessment results, is developed.
It consists of identified suitable safety measures
and safety requirements based on a combination
of the TLS and the ALARP approach.
1 Introduction
With the steady increase in air traffic, there is an
urgent need to use existing and newly proposed
technologies in an efficient way. This is reflected
in the design of new high capacity aircraft and
new advanced ATM concepts and procedures.
However, it is also recognized that safety is a key
quality that should be guaranteed. In particular the
wake vortex problem becomes more important,
for example at Heathrow where many incidents
occurred due to wake vortex encounters, and at
Frankfurt where there are two closely spaced
parallel runways and no extension possibility that
is publicly acceptable.
This requires tools and methods to enable a
quantitative assessment of wake vortex safety. In
view of the uncertainties and the difficulties in
understanding of the wake vortex phenomena,
this paper proposes a probabilistic approach.
To support the design of new aircraft and new
advanced ATM concepts, a probabilistic wake
vortex induced risk model has been developed.
The model is based on a stochastic framework that
incorporates a flight path evolution model and
three wake vortex related sub models:
• Wake vortex evolution model
To determine the stochastic wake vortex
motion, decay and strength in time at certain
positions relative to the generator aircraft;
• Wake vortex interaction model
To determine the stochastic vortex-induced
rolling moment on the encountering aircraft;
• Aircraft control capability model
To determine the control capability – in
terms of maximum rolling control moment –
of the encountering aircraft.
This model can be used to evaluate the separation
distances for the current practice, and promising
new concepts that may enable a safe reduction of
the current separation standards. Identified safety
criticalities, which have a large contribution to the
wake vortex induced risk, can be fed back to the
ATM designers, who can use these results to
redesign or improve their proposed ATM concept.
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The present separation distances are based on a
matrix of different aircraft weight classes. For
aircraft (Leader and Follower) approaching a
single runway the required separation distances
as recommended by ICAO are given in table 1.
Table 1 Minimum required separation distances
L / F Heavy Medium Light
Heavy       4       5      6
Medium       -       3      4
Light       -       3      3
These required separation distances stem from
the early 70’s and are not based on safety
requirements. Although over the last 30 years
they have ‘proven to be safe’, the current safety
level is unclear and there is a deficiency of tools
and methods to determine more appropriate
separation distances. The proposed modeling
approach aims at solving this deficiency.
Under contract to DFS, this probabilistic model
has been applied to evaluate the wake vortex
induced risk related to the newly proposed High
Approach Landing System (HALS) at Frankfurt
airport. The model will be extended and applied
in the S-Wake project for the European
Commission. S-Wake aims to develop and apply
tools for assessing appropriate safe separation
distances. An assessment will be made of the
wake vortex safety level under various
operational and weather conditions.
Section 2 contains the safety management
framework, including identified suitable safety
measures and adopted safety requirements. In
Section 3 the developed probabilistic safety
assessment model is described. Section 4
describes how the quantitative safety assessment
results can be used to evaluate safe separation
distances. It also motivates the benefits of the
proposed probabilistic modeling approach. The
conclusions and recommendations are given in
Section 5.
2 Safety criteria framework
This section proposes a safety criteria
framework, which describes how to judge the
acceptability of the obtained safety assessment
results. It consists of selected safety measures
and safety requirements that are based on a
combination of the TLS and the ALARP
approach.
2.1 The ALARP approach
The ALARP approach is based on a banded
assessment of decision structure, which contains a
tolerable region bounded by maximally negligible
and minimally unacceptable levels of risk. Within
the tolerable region the risk must be proven to be
As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) in
order to be acceptable (Ref. 12). Cost-Benefit
Analysis (CBA) is a method that can be used to
demonstrate that any further risk reduction in the
tolerable region is impracticable.
Up to now, the ALARP approach has mainly
been used in industries other than aviation (e.g.
the chemical, offshore, nuclear and some
transport industries). Recently the development
of the ALARP approach for use in aviation risk
management has been investigated within the
context of Reduced Vertical Separation
Minimum (RVSM) in ECAC countries (Ref. 9).
It was concluded that for aviation there seems to
be no case for replacing any accepted Target
Level of Safety (TLS) approach with ALARP.
However, since most practical applications of the
ALARP approach use fixed risk criteria like the
TLS to determine the boundaries of the ALARP
region, there appear to be good grounds for
combining the TLS and ALARP approach for
application to aviation risk management. In
reference 9 it is argued that a combination of
these two safety management approaches in a
way as given in figure 1 is indeed beneficial to
aviation risk management. This approach will
therefore be followed to assess the safety
requirements for wake vortex induced risk.
Figure 1 ALARP framework for safety requirements [9]
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According to figure 1, the ALARP region will be
determined in the following way:
• The TLS is calculated on the basis of a
common method for TLS assessment;
• This TLS is supplemented by an ALARP
region extending from 0.02%TLS to
2%TLS;
• Risks above 2%TLS (the least stringent
boundary) are judged unacceptable and must
be reduced;
• Risks below 0.02%TLS (the most stringent
boundary) are judged negligible and do not
need further reduction;
• For risks within the ALARP region, a range
of risk reduction measures should be
identified and evaluated using CBA.
2.2 Identification of safety measures
In order to judge whether a newly proposed
procedure is safe or to determine more appropriate
safe separation distances, a suitable measure for
quantification of the wake vortex induced risk is
required. Up to now several measures have been
used to quantify the hazard imposed by wake
vortices: e.g. bank angle, roll angle, roll rate and
roll acceleration. However, since they do not
relate to the safety perception of most involved
actor groups (e.g. crew, passengers, controllers,
regulators, people living in the airport vicinity),
they are felt to be insufficient (Refs. 6, 14).
It is argued that a distinction can be made between
the following 3 risk events:
1. Incident occurs if an encountering aircraft
experiences a roll upset, with possibly some
minor injuries to, but no fatalities among,
occupants;
2. Accident occurs if a wake vortex encounter
results in serious injuries to, or death of, a
relatively small proportion of the occupants,
due to rolling and normal accelerations
throwing them about inside the aircraft;
3. Crash-into-terrain occurs if an encountering
aircraft hits the ground as a result of height
loss and an increase in rate of descent during
the encounter.
It is also argued that there may not be one most
appropriate type of risk measure. Three types of
suitable risk measures emerged:
1. Risk event probability per movement (e.g.
take off or landing);
2. Risk event probability per year (or expected
average time interval between 2 risk events);
3. Economic risk per year.
In this paper, the safety requirements are assessed
on the basis of the most commonly used safety
measure: the risk event probability per movement.
However, the method described in section 2.1 can
easily be used to assess safety requirements based
on the other two identified safety measures.
2.3 Adoption of safety requirements
The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) have
established a Joint Airworthiness Requirements
(JAR) risk categorization, which relates a
number of hazard categories (catastrophic,
hazardous, major, minor, and no effect) to a
maximum probability of occurrence (Refs. 10,
11). This generally accepted risk categorization,
which was designed for ATC systems, is used to
derive the safety requirements for the 3 wake
vortex induced risk events. According to
references 10 and 11, the 3 wake vortex induced
risk events can be categorized as follows:
• Incident: Major Effect;
• Accident: Hazardous Effect;
• Crash-into-terrain: Catastrophic Effect.
The JAR hazard categories are related to
maximum probabilities of occurrence per flight
hour as described in reference 10 (Amendment
JAR 25.1309, Change 13; 3.3.1-3.3.4). This
measure is felt not suitable for approach and
take-off, since these phases only take a relatively
small amount of time. Below, a method is used
that applies to the selected safety measures.
A crash-into-terrain was categorized as
Catastrophic, i.e. the maximum probability of
occurrence per flight hour when all Failure
Conditions are taken together, must be assessed to
be Extremely Remote: in between 10-7 and 10-9 .
Depending on the world region, the mean flight
time may be estimated at 2 to 4 hours. Assuming
3 hours, this implies a maximum probability of
crash-into-terrain that is in between 3%10-7 and
3%10-9 per flight. Dividing the risk equally
between the three parts of a flight (take off, en-
route and approach) implies for the crash-into-
terrain probability per movement:
]101,101[ 79 −−
−−
××∈terrainíntocrashTLS
An accident was categorised as Hazardous, i.e.
each Failure Condition leading to this risk event
should be assessed as Extremely Remote: have a
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probability of occurrence in between 10-7 and
10-9 per flight hour. Of course, there are a
number of possible Failure Conditions. The JAR
requirement for the Catastrophic category
implies that there might be 100 possible Failure
Conditions leading to a risk event (Ref. 10).
Using this implication and a similar reasoning as
above implies for the accident probability per
movement:
]101,101[ 57 −− ××∈accidentTLS
An incident was categorised as Major, i.e. each
Failure condition which may lead to this risk
event should be assessed as “Remote”: have a
probability of occurrence in between 10-5 and
10-7 per flight hour. A similar reasoning as in the
above implies for the incident probability per
movement:
]101,101[ 35 −− ××∈incidentTLS
A method is described suggesting ranges from
which to adopt the Target Level of Safety (TLS).
In order to set the TLS, policy makers should be
consulted. Once a unique TLS has been set, it is
possible to determine the ALARP region
extending from 0.02%TLS to 2%TLS.
3 Wake vortex safety assessment model
3.1 Overview of the risk model
To determine the selected safety measures for the
three possible risk events, an appropriate safety
assessment model is required. In view of the
uncertainties and the difficulties in understanding
of the wake vortex phenomena, it is proposed to
follow a probabilistic modeling approach.
The probabilistic model should enable the
evaluation of wake vortex safety under various
operational and weather conditions. It should be
possible to evaluate the current practice as well
as promising new concepts, such as aircraft
design changes, operational improvements, or
weather related separation distances. An initial
version of the model should focus on the
airspace around the airport (i.e. landing and take
off operations), since this sector is most limiting
to air traffic capacity. The modeling approach
should be able to cover the situation of a
sequence of aircraft that fly towards different
kinds of runway configurations (e.g. a single
runway or closely spaced parallel runways).
Considering this, four probabilistic sub models
are required to be integrated within a stochastic
framework that enables calculation of the
incident, accident and crash-into-terrain risk:
• Wake vortex evolution model
To determine the stochastic wake vortex
motion, decay and strength in time at certain
positions relative to the generator aircraft;
• Wake vortex interaction model
To determine the stochastic vortex-induced
rolling moment on the encountering aircraft;
• Aircraft control capability model
To determine the control capability – in
terms of maximum rolling control moment –
of the encountering aircraft;
• Flight path evolution model
To describe the stochastic flight path
evolution of the involved aircraft.
Reference 13 contains an extensive literature
survey leading to the selection of the following
deterministic wake vortex related sub models:
• A wake vortex evolution model that is based
on references 1 and 2 (Corjon and Poinsot);
• A wake vortex interaction model that is
based on reference 3 (Kuzmin);
• Aircraft control capability model that is
based on reference 4 (Woodfield).
These deterministic models can be probabilitised
in three steps as follows (Ref. 14):
1. Representation of uncertainty about the
variables by histograms and/or probability
distributions;
2. Execution of Monte Carlo Simulations to
obtain histograms for the model outputs;
3. Execution of goodness-of-fit tests to obtain
probability distributions for model outputs.
A probabilistic flight path model is used that is
based on references 5 and 15. The lateral and
vertical flight path deviations are based on the
ICAO Collision Risk Model (CRM) Manual for
ILS  operations (Ref. 5). The longitudinal flight
path deviations are based on a stochastic model,
which takes into account wind and controller/
pilot interactions (Ref. 15).
In Sections 3.2 and 3.3 descriptions are given of
the three wake vortex related deterministic sub
models. Together with the flight path model,
these are integrated into a stochastic framework
that is based on the TOPAZ methodology (Ref.
8), which is described in Section 3.4.
-7-
NLR-TP-99454
Figure 2 below gives an overview of the main
elements of the probabilistic safety assessment.
Fig. 2 Overview of the probabilistic approach
3.2 Wake vortex evolution model
This section provides a mathematical description
of the used wake vortex evolution model, which
originates from references 1 and 2. This “Corjon-
Poinsot” model takes into account stratification,
atmospheric turbulence, ground effects (rebound,
divergence) and crosswind (advection, shear). It is
extended with probabilistic wind field models to
include the impact of wind in the vertical and
lateral direction during the evolution (Ref. 14).
The model enables determination of the wake
vortices motion, decay and strength in time at
certain positions relative to its generator aircraft.
This aircraft generates two counter rotating
vortices of which the positions and strengths are
to be determined. The positions are given relative
to a rectangular xyz-coordinate system, with x-
axis in longitudinal direction, y-axis in lateral
direction and z-axis in the vertical direction.
The positions of the left and right centers of two
vortices, are represented by },,{ −−−− = tttt zyxX
and },,{ ++++ = tttt zyxX .The strengths of the two
vortices at time t are denoted by ℜ∈Γ−t  and
ℜ∈Γ+t  respectively. The initial positions at time
t=0 are denoted by −0X  and +0X , and are
determined by the three dimensional position of
the center of the leader aircraft at time t=0. The
initial strengths are denoted by −Γ0  and 
+Γ0 .
3.2.1 Wake vortex strength and decay
The basic equation of wake vortex decay is that
the rate of change of circulation strength equals
the sum of the rates of change of circulation due
to viscosity, buoyancy, turbulence, and crosswind:
crosswturbbuoyvisc dt
d
dt
d
dt
d
dt
d
dt
d ±±±±± Γ
+
Γ
+
Γ
+
Γ
=
Γ
The rate of change for viscosity depends on
vortex descent speed, viscous force coefficient
(CD), wake oval width (Lwv), angle between force
and drift velocity of a vortex (t), and the initial
spacing between the vortices (b0), and is equal to
0
2
cos
2
cos
b
LCX
dt
d twvDt
ityvis
±±±
=
Γ θ
The rate of change for buoyancy force depends
on the area of the wake oval (Awv), the Brunt–
Visl frequency (N), the descent distance of a
vortex, the angle between the force and drift
velocity of a vortex (t), and the initial spacing
between the two vortices (b0), and is given by:
[ ]
0
0
2 cos
b
zzNA
dt
d ttwv
buoyancy
±±±±
−
=
Γ θ
The rate of change for atmospheric turbulence
depends on the rms turbulence velocity (q), the
vortex circulation (t), and the initial spacing
between the vortices (b0), and is given by:
0
82.0
b
q
dt
d t
turbulence
±± Γ
−=
Γ
An effect of crosswind is the acceleration of the
decay of the vortex with the opposite sign
vorticity from the crosswind. The decay rate of
the other vortex is not influenced significantly.
This effect can be modeled by adding a term in
the basic equation of wake vortex decay:
003
2 bwC
dt
d
DV
crossw
σ−=
Γ+
  and 0=Γ
−
crossw
dt
d
with CDV the viscous coefficient caused by
crosswind,  the wind shear coefficient, and w0
the crosswind magnitude at initial height z0+.
The initial value of the circulation at t=0 depends
on the weight of the leader (Wi), the initial
aircraft true airspeed, the initial spacing between
the vortices (b0) and the density () (Ref. 17):
][ 0,000 xi
i
xb
W
ωρ −
=Γ±

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The vortex lifetime depends on two influencing
phenomena: Crow instability and vortex bursting
3.2.2 Wake vortex position
In order to determine the wake vortex induced
rolling moment on an encountering aircraft j, the
trajectories of the counter-rotating wake vortices
are also required. References 1 and 2 provide
basic equations for these trajectories, thereby
accounting for divergence and rebound effects.
The model gives equations for the total induced
velocity of primary and secondary vortices.
These equations are modified to include the wind
speed  in all three directions. The equations
from which the trajectories of the two counter-
rotating vortices can be computed are given by:
x
i
dt
dx
ω=
''
''
2 2
cos
2 i
ii
ij
ij
ij
j
y
i
rr
zz
dt
dy
π
θ
π
ω
Γ
+
−Γ
+= ∑
≠
''
''
2 2
sin
2 i
ii
ij
ij
ij
j
z
i
rr
yy
dt
dz
π
θ
π
ω
Γ
+
−Γ
+= ∑
≠
2''
''
][2 i
iii
rdt
d
π
θ Γ−Γ
=
( ) ( )222 ijijij zzyyr −+−=
where i=1,2 and j=1,..,4. An explanation of the
terms in these equations can be found in
references 1, 2, 13, and 14.
The wind field model has to be tuned for the
airport situation. To evaluate the wake vortex
induced risk of the proposed High Approach
Landing System (HALS) procedure at Frankfurt
airport with its closely spaced parallel runways,
this has been done on the basis of statistical
measurement based data.
The horizontal wind model accounts for height
dependency. It appeared that horizontal wind can
have a major impact to the wake vortex induced
risks. Head wind reduces the effective distance
between the trailer and the wake vortex that has
been generated by the leader, whereas tail wind
effectively enlarges this distance.
The impact of head/tail wind on the risk depends
largely on the ATM procedures and runway
layout: for some situations head wind is more
dangerous, in other situations tail wind.
Crosswind may transport wakes to other
runways. In the case of a single runway strong
crosswind may transport the wake vortex so that
it is far from the trailer (in lateral direction).
The vertical wind field model accounts for
varying weather conditions. The strongest
vertical wind speeds occur in case of a
convective atmosphere. In this case, wakes can
travel significant distances. In addition, the left
wake can be in an upwind, whereas the right
wake is in a downwind. Hence the distance
between the left and right wake can become so
large that they may be considered as isolated
wakes. In a convective atmosphere there may be
isolated wakes that stay at the height at which
they have been generated (or they may rise). This
implies a relative high wake vortex induced risk.
3.3 Wake encounter model
This section provides a description of the used
wake encounter model, consisting of two parts:
• A wake vortex interaction model;
• An aircraft control capability model.
It is based on the assumption that a risk event
occurs if the vortex-induced rolling moment
exceeds the maximum control capability of the
encountering aircraft. The severity of the risk
event increases if the difference between the two
increases and/or the wake vortex encounter
occurs at an altitude closer to the ground.
3.3.1 Wake vortex interaction model
The wake vortex interaction model is based on
reference 3, and results from the VORSAF
project carried out by TsAGI under contract to
ISTC. The description of the deterministic
version that has been probabilitised is given.
The aircraft encountering the vortex alters, to
some extent, the wake vortex flow field as
generated by the leader. In general, one effect is
to reduce the rolling moment as calculated with
the wake vortex evolution model.
The vortex-induced rolling moment on the
encountering aircraft j is modeled as a function
of vortex strength and the distance between
aircraft axis and vortex axis. The rolling moment
is estimated for the situation with vortex axis
parallel to the aircraft axis with the assumption
of a rectangular wing, and is given by (Ref. 3):
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2
)( zdydF
bV
C
tM jj
t
j
tj
induced
π
±Γ
=
The vortex-induced rolling moment depends on
the flight speed of the encountering aircraft (Vtj),
its wing span (bj), the vortex strength (t), the
aircraft specific coefficient Cj
 , and a function F.
This function F, describing the influence of the
distance between vortex axis and aircraft axis, is:
( )
( )





 +
+

 −
−



++
−+
+=
yd
zd
yd
zdyd
zdyd
zdydzd
zdydF
~
~2/1
arctan
~
~2/1
arctan~
~2/1~
~2/1~ln
2
~
1)~,~( 22
22
where the required input values of F depend on
the distance between vortex axis and aircraft axis
in lateral and vertical direction (dy and dz), the
vortex core radius (rcore) and the wing span (bj) of
the encountering aircraft j, according to:
j
core
b
dyr
yd
22
~
+
=
jb
dz
zd =~
For vortex core radius growth in time of vortices
that did not have changed state by bursting or
linking the following equation is used:
)0125.0,max()( 0, trtr otcorecore Γ= =
Note that the vortex-induced rolling moment
attains its maximum at distance equal to the
vortex core radius from the vortex axis. This
indicates that the majority of angular momentum
is in the regions farthest from the core. Outside
the core radius, the rolling moment is negligible.
3.3.2 Aircraft control capability model
The aircraft control capability model is based on
references 3 and 4. The deterministic version that
has been probabilitised is described below.
The basic equation for the maximum roll control
moment of an aircraft j depends on the wing span
(bj), the wing area (Sj), the air density (), the
aircraft true airspeed (
tx
j
tx ,ω− ), the maximum
steady roll rate ( pˆ ), and the roll damping
coefficient ( j
rdC ), and is given by:
[ ] pCxbStM jrdtxjtjjjcontrol ˆ4
][)(
,
2
ωρ −−= 
The equation for the maximum steady roll rate
depends on encounter time (tenc), bank angle
((tenc)) and roll mode time constant (), and is:
)1(
)(
ˆ
ττ
φ
enct
enc
enc
et
t
p
−
−−
=
Reference 3 provides a method for estimating pˆ
on the basis of the British Civil Airworthiness
Requirements (BCAR). An aircraft approaching
to land must be capable of rolling through 60°
from 30° of bank angle in 7 seconds. Assuming
that an aircraft meets this requirement, and using
the fact that the roll mode time constant is
usually around 1 sec. leads to pˆ =0.175 rad/sec.
The equation for the roll damping coefficient
depends on the local lift curve slope of the wing
(aj) and the ratio between local wing chord (cj)
and standard mean chord ( c j), and is given by:
∫∫ ′′−=−=
2/1
0
2
22/1
0
44 ydy
c
c
a
b
yd
b
y
c
c
aC j
j
j
jjj
j
jj
rd
The roll damping coefficient strongly depends on
the shape of an aircraft wing, thus reflecting the
aircraft design in the developed risk model. To
estimate this coefficient, some assumptions must
be made regarding the shape of the aircraft wing.
3.4 Integration with TOPAZ methodology
The four probabilistic sub models are integrated
into a stochastic framework as described in
reference 6. It is based on NLR’s Traffic
Organizer and Perturbation Analyzer (TOPAZ).
The TOPAZ methodology has been developed to
provide designers of ATM concepts or
procedures with safety feedback following on a
re-design cycle. An overview of how such safety
feedback is obtained is given in figure 3 (Ref. 8).
During the assessment cycle two types of
assessments are sequentially conducted:
1. Qualitative Assessment (steps 1-3)
Information about nominal and non-nominal
behavior of the ATM concept or procedure
is gathered, through hazard identification
sessions with a variety of experts, resulting
in a list of potential wake vortex hazards.
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Fig. 3 TOPAZ assessment cycle
2. Quantitative Assessment (steps 4-7)
A stochastic dynamical model representation
characterization of the wake vortex induced
risk is developed. This led to an effective
procedure, consisting of a number of steps to
be followed, to determine the incident risk,
accident risk, and crash-into-terrain risk.
The results of the quantitative safety assessment
are fed back to the designers, who can use the
results to redesign or optimize their proposed
ATM design if necessary.
4 Evaluation of safe separation distances
This section illustrates the benefits of the
probabilistic approach, on the basis of the main
outputs of quantitative safety. Assume that an
operational scenario has been defined, which
characterizes a specific operational procedure for
a given type of runway configuration.
For each of the three identified wake vortex
induced risk events, a figure will be produced
that provides the risk (in terms of one of the
selected risk (or safety) measures) as a function
of the separation distance between successive
aircraft. Figure 4 illustrates this approach for a
combination of leader-follower aircraft {i,j} .
An ALARP framework as proposed in section 2
can now be used to determine an appropriate and
adequately safe minimum separation distance for
this combination of aircraft {i,j}.
In order to do so, the calculated risk curve should
be compared with the safety requirements based
on the ALARP region. For separation distances
corresponding to the tolerable region, Cost-
Benefit Analysis (CBA) may be used to
demonstrate whether or not further reduction of
the separation distance is practicable.
Fig. 4 Wake vortex risk versus separation distance
In order to investigate whether a safe reduction
of the current minimum required separation
distances might be possible, it is of major
importance to identify the safety criticalities,
which have the largest contribution to the wake
vortex induced risk. Therefore sensitivity
analysis should be carried out, especially focused
on aircraft design improvements, operational
improvements, and weather impact.
Sensitivity analysis focused on aircraft design
changes might produce two figures, showing the
risk and minimum required separation distance
as a function of aircraft design. Based on these
figures, it will be possible to identify ‘optimal’
aircraft design changes, provided that these
changes are feasible and cost-beneficial. Figure 5
illustrates this approach for a combination of
leader-follower aircraft. A similar approach can
be followed to evaluate and compare different
kinds of possible operational procedures.
Fig. 5 Impact of aircraft design
Sensitivity analysis focused on weather type
might also produce two figures, showing the risk
and minimum required separation distance as
function of weather type. Based on these figures,
it is possible to ‘optimise’ air traffic capacity by
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authorizing different minimum required
separation distances under different types of
weather. Figure 6 illustrates this approach for a
combination of leader-follower aircraft {i,j}.
Fig. 6 Impact of weather type
The steady increase in air traffic imposes a need
for enhanced airport capacity, and the desire to
safely reduce existing separation standards.
Therefore new concepts are being developed to
reduce the risk imposed by one of the main
limiting factors: the wake vortex risk. Examples
of such new concepts are:
• Wake Vortex Warning System (WVWS);
• High Approach Landing System (HALS);
• Aircraft Vortex Spacing System (AVOSS).
Such new concepts may provide roughly 2
possible benefits, as illustrated in figure 7:
• Increase the safety level while maintaining
current separation standards;
• Increase airport capacity by reducing current
separation standards while maintaining the
current safety level.
Figure 7 Possible benefits of promising new concepts
5 Conclusions
This paper describes the development of a
probabilistic wake vortex safety assessment
model. It can be used as a tool to evaluate the
separation standards for the current practice, and
for promising new concepts which may enable a
safe reduction of the current separation standards.
Identified safety criticalities (bottlenecks), which
have the largest contribution to the wake vortex
induced risk, can be fed back to the ATM
designers, who can use them to redesign or
improve their proposed ATM concept.
A safety management framework, which is based
on a combination of the TLS and the ALARP
approach, has been proposed. It is based on 3
defined wake vortex induced risk events, i.e.
incident risk, accident risk, and crash-into-terrain
risk. Three suitable safety measures evolved:
• Risk event probability per movement;
• Risk event probability per year;
• Economic risk per year.
For each of the three risk events TLS ranges
have been proposed from which policy makers
may adopt a unique TLS. Once the TLS has been
set, it is possible to determine the ALARP region
extending from 0.02%TLS  to 2%TLS.
The developed wake vortex safety assessment
model integrates the following sub models:
• Wake vortex evolution model
To determine the stochastic wake vortex
motion, decay and strength in time at certain
positions relative to the generator aircraft;
• Wake vortex interaction model
To determine the stochastic vortex-induced
rolling moment on the encountering aircraft;
• Aircraft control capability model
To determine the control capability – in
terms of maximum rolling control moment –
of the encountering aircraft;
• Flight path evolution model
To describe the stochastic flight path
evolution of the involved aircraft.
Mathematical descriptions of the wake vortex
related deterministic sub models have been
given. These models have been adapted,
probabilitised, and integrated with NLR’s Traffic
Organizer and Perturbation AnalyZer (TOPAZ)
methodology (Ref. 8).
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The benefits of the developed probabilistic
modeling approach have been illustrated on the
basis of the main outputs of a quantitative safety
assessment.
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